The Eisenhower Doctrine was a policy enunciated by Dwight D. A danger that could be linked to communists of any nation could conceivably invoke the doctrine. In the global political context, the doctrine was made in response to the possibility of a generalized war, threatened due to the Soviet Union's latent threat becoming involved in Egypt after the Suez Crisis. On the regional level, the doctrine's intent was to provide the independent Arab regimes with an alternative to Nasser's political control, strengthening them while isolating communist influence through Nasser's isolation.
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This has left the American This has left the American understanding of the nationalist movement neglected. Since one cannot understand the U. From scholars, missionaries, intelligence analysts, and journalists this paper seeks to unveil the American understanding of the Arab nationalist movement from The U.
During the first stage of the Cold War, one of the most important factor for the Middle East relations development was an expansion of Arab nationalism and panarabism. The politics of the new Egypt leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, were Thus the growing influence of Nasser forced the US and Israeli government get involved in Lebanon political crisis In this paper the author examines Lebanon crisis in the context of the US-Israeli relations by using a broad spectre of the US and Soviet open and declassified documents.
The research methodology was based on principles of the new Cold War history concept. The author concludes that the Lebanese crisis contributed to a further development of the US-Israeli relations. The Blue bat military invasion had a long-lasting effect on the development of the Middle East.
American influence in the Middle East can be traced directly to Suez Crisis of This paper presents an analysis of private communications between British and US leaders and represents a significant re-appraisal of common assumptions This paper presents an analysis of private communications between British and US leaders and represents a significant re-appraisal of common assumptions about the making of the crisis.
It finds that British strategic considerations were skewed by misinformation and deliberate misunderstanding, encouraged by Eisenhower, who then conspired with Macmillan to set Eden up 'for a fall' for their own ends. Their close personal friendships and experience working together in North Africa in WW2 are cited extensively, along with secret meetings and testimony from the times.
Building a Client State: American arms policies towards Iran, Precious little has been written in academic scholarship about the US arms relationship with Iran. Much of the scholarly focus has focused on twin crises in Iranian history: the British and American sponsored coup and the preceding Much of the scholarly focus has focused on twin crises in Iranian history: the British and American sponsored coup and the preceding oil blockade, and the Islamic revolution that swept the Shah from power.
Hence, the years in-between and are often treated only in passing. This article focuses on the very early years of the relationship between and within which successive US Presidents viewed Iran as a relatively weak chess piece in a sensitive region, with military aid being one of the major levers with which to secure the stabilisation and pro-American disposition of Iran in the emerging Cold War context.
During that time Nasser attempted to unit all Arabic-speaking people under his rule. What complicated his efforts to achieve unity was the competition for power between oil-rich Saudi Arabia and strategically-located Egypt because of the Suez Canal that was closed to shipping after the Suez Crisis. It was complicated by the Saudis secret support for the Muslim Brotherhood that wanted to overthrow Nasser and impose an Islamic regime like that in Saudi Arabia.
Further complicating the situation was the Cold War. Nasser was in fact an anti-Communist who wanted to follow a neutral course by appealing for aid from both the United States and the Soviet Union. But during the Eisenhower administration the United States wanted to maintain an alliance with Saudi Arabia with its rich oil resources without alienating the American Jewish supporters of Israel.
Kennedy tried to restrain Israel from developing a nuclear bomb, but his successor Lyndon Johnson was too preoccupied with the Vietnam War to follow up. In retrospect, there are many lessons for today from this period of Arab Nationalism. First, the United States was blinded by the Cold War ideology of countering the spread of Communism, just as it is blinded today by the concept of the War on Terror, instead of understanding the underlying ethnic issues behind these ideologies.
Second, by not seeing these conflicts in terms of the time-honored American principle of self-determination, the United States has taken the sides of anti-democratic monarchies in the case of Jordan and Saudi Arabia against anti-imperialist in the case of Egypt and anti-colonial in the case of the Palestinians from the Arab point of view movements.
Third, during this period Israel secretly developed nuclear weapons, which was initially opposed by the Kennedy administration, but then overlooked by the Johnson administration.
The answer should be nuclear disarmament of all countries with nuclear weapons. Fourth, the United States seems to be baffled by Islamic movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, first by supporting them and then by opposing them in case the case of Egypt and Afghanistan.
In Egypt, then as today, strong military leaders like Nasser and the current regime , were and are necessary to overcome the anti-democratic threat of Islamism. Related Topics. US public diplomacy in the Middle East. Follow Following. US Diplomatic History. US History. US Foreign Policy. Cold War. Second World War. Ads help cover our server costs. Remember me on this computer. Enter the email address you signed up with and we'll email you a reset link.
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The Eisenhower Doctrine